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1. INTRODUCTION
As the International Criminal Court (ICC) begins to sentence defendants,
it faces the difficult task of determining how much punishment is appropriate
for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The importance of the
ICC's early sentencing decisions extends well beyond the individuals sentenced
and the victims who suffer from their crimes. These decisions will shape pu-
nishment norms at the ICC, influence the development of such norms at other
international courts, and may even affect sentencing norms in some national
systems, particularly those adjudicating international crimes.
The task of developing international sentencing norms is daunting be-
cause such norms vary dramatically across national systems. In some countries,
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such as the United States, lengthy prison sentences are common, even for rela-
tively minor offenses, and conditions of incarceration tend to be severe. In oth-
er parts of the world, sentences are substantially shorter and prison conditions
are much less harsh. In such systems, for instance, prisoners are offered educa-
tional opportunities and skills training, rather than being asked to perform
menial labor.
Given the disparities in national sentencing norms, it should come as no
surprise that international courts have engaged in inconsistent sentencing prac-
tices. Some such courts have imposed reasonably short terms of incarceration,
even for crimes against humanity, while others have handed down heavy sen-
tences for similar crimes. Moreover, the conditions in which international de-
fendants serve their sentences vary considerably. International courts do not
have their own prison facilities but instead send defendants to the national pris-
ons of volunteer countries with incarceration conditions that span the severity
spectrum.
Despite these wide variations in sentencing norms and practices, the
commentary on the appropriate severity of international punishment is surpri-
singly uniform: with few exceptions, commentators call for harsh justice The
harshness the commentators advocate usually comes in the form of lengthy
terms of incarceration, but at least one commentator also argues that prison
conditions must be uncomfortable for international criminals.2 To justify the
call to harshness, commentators tend to invoke the seriousness of international
crimes in conjunction with the commentator's preferred punishment philoso-
phy. Thus, retributivists argue that in light of the seriousness of international
crimes, harsh punishment is necessary to give offenders their "just deserts."
Meanwhile, utilitarians assert that for such serious crimes, only harsh punish-
ment will promote desired social goods, in particular crime prevention.
This Article's primary goal is to refute the call for harsh international jus-
tice. Contrary to the claims of harsh justice proponents, no punishment theory
dictates a particular level of punishment severity for international crimes. Al-
though the major punishment theories have been debated internationally for
centuries, no theory has developed that can explain how much punishment is
deserved for genocide or is required to deter crimes against humanity.
Moreover, the often-heard assertion that international crimes are so se-
rious as to require harsh punishment, whether on retributive or consequential
grounds, is misleading. While many international crimes are certainly very se-
1. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of International Criminal Sentenc-
ing, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW 381, 390 (Goran
Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2009) [hereinafter Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory]; Jose E. Alvarez,
Crimes ofStates/Crimes ofHate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 418 (1999); Shahram
Dana, The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with Conse-
quentialist Aspirations?, 3 PENN ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 1 (forthcoming 2014); Mark B. Harmon & Fergal
Gaynor, The Sentencing Practice of International Criminal Tribunals: Ordinary Sentences for Extraor-
dinary Crimes, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 683, 711 (2007). The most notable exception is William Schabas.
See William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 461 (1997) [hereinafter Schabas, Sentencing].
2. See Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory, supra note 1, at 387.
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rious, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, the subject matter of international
criminal law is expanding to include increasingly less serious crimes and less
culpable defendants.3 The gravity rhetoric that pervades the regime thus threat-
ens injustice at the sentencing stage for at least some defendants.
Similarly, the narratives that characterize international justice efforts also
enhance the risk of overpunishing perpetrators of international crimes. To gal-
vanize international action, politicians and statesmen often paint one side of a
morally complex conflict as evil, its leaders as monsters. That side becomes the
enemy of the international community and the other its friend, or at least its al-
ly. Such narratives, along with gravity rhetoric, render appeals to intuition par-
ticularly problematic as a basis for determining appropriate punishment severi-
ty for international crimes. They enhance the risk that judges will impose more
punishment than they would consider appropriate if the reality of the crimes
were not clouded by rhetoric or narrative. It is therefore critical for internation-
al courts to develop sentencing norms to guide their decisions.
The second goal of this Article, therefore, is to suggest how international
judges should begin to develop such norms. As a preliminary matter, interna-
tional courts must identify the community to which their work is primarily ad-
dressed. This is critical because punishment severity is largely a matter of
community norms rather than punishment theory. Some commentators have ar-
gued that international courts should apply the punishment norms of the nation-
al communities most affected by the crimes in question. This Article takes a
different view, arguing that the work of international courts, especially the ICC,
is addressed primarily to the global community and should therefore develop
global norms of punishment severity.
Finally, the Article argues that in developing global norms of sentence
severity, international courts should look to the human rights norms that in-
formed their creation and should generally err on the side of leniency. While
there are no generally accepted definitions of "leniency" or "harshness" in the
sentencing context, this recommendation amounts to a call for international
courts to continue to reject the death penalty, to avoid life sentences, to eschew
lengthy prison sentences except in extreme cases, and to ensure humane condi-
tions of incarceration. International courts should respect offenders' human
dignity and should aim to rehabilitate rather than simply to punish.
The ICC's first sentence, now on appeal, arguably comports with this le-
niency recommendation. Thomas Lubanga was convicted of recruiting and us-
ing hundreds of children as soldiers in armed conflict.4 The Prosecutor, citing
the gravity of the crimes, requested a thirty-year sentence,5 the maximum term
of years permitted under the ICC Statute. Indeed, the Prosecutor asked the
3. Margaret M. deGuzman, How Serious Are International Crimes? The Gravity Problem in
International Criminal Law, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 18, 36-40 (2012) [hereinafter deGuzman,
How Serious].
4. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 76 of the Statute (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl438370.pdf.
5. Id. 92.
6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77.1(a), July 17, 1998, 2187
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Court to adopt a presumptive baseline sentence of twenty-four years for all ICC
crimes in light of their gravity.7 The Trial Chamber rejected these requests8 and
and sentenced Lubanga to fourteen years in prison.9 The Appeals Chamber,
which is now reviewing the sentence, should likewise reject calls to inflict a
harsher sentence on Lubanga. 0
The Article's argument proceeds in four parts. First, the Article demon-
strates the challenges international courts face in identifying appropriate sen-
tencing norms by briefly describing the diversity of sentencing norms in na-
tional systems and the concomitant disparities in current international
sentencing practice. Second, the Article critiques the various calls for harsh jus-
tice in the scholarly commentary, arguing that punishment severity relates less
to theoretical commitments than to community norms. Third, the Article ex-
plains why the intuition that the gravity of international crimes mandates harsh
punishment is a troubling basis for sentencing decisions in light of the distort-
ing effects of international criminal law's gravity rhetoric and narratives. Final-
ly, the Article sets forth the arguments for the development of international pu-
nishment severity norms rooted in human rights that counsel against harshness
and favor erring on the side of leniency.
II. SENTENCE SEVERITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
In discussing "sentence severity," this Article focuses on the length of
terms of incarceration, the availability of the death penalty, and conditions of
incarceration. Sentences can be considered severe in other ways as well, includ-
ing, for example, by inflicting corporal harms and intentional humiliation.
However, for purposes of discussing the appropriate severity of international
sentences, the more limited focus of this Article makes sense for two reasons.
First, the punishment international courts inflict is limited to terms of incarcera-
tion and fines. Second, the arguments scholars have made in favor of harsh in-
ternational punishment favor long terms of incarceration and difficult prison
conditions.11
As Section A demonstrates, national systems differ greatly in the sen-
tences they impose and the conditions in which those sentences are served. This
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
7. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 76 of the Statute, 92.
8. Id. 93.
9. Id. 99.
10. Dana, supra note 1. The ICC Prosecutor has appealed the sentence. Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Prosecution's Notice of Appeal against Trial Chamber I's "Decision on Sen-
tence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute" (Oct. 3, 2012). Some victims and advocates have also ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the sentence. See, e.g., Olivia Bueno, 14 Years: Too Much or Not Enough?,
LUBANGATRIAL.ORG (July 16, 2012), http://www.lubangatrial.org/2012/07/16/14-years-too-much-or-
not-enough/ (quoting victims who believe Lubanga's sentence was too lenient); DR Congo Warlord
Thomas Lubanga Sentenced to 14 Years, BBC (July 10, 2012, 12:38 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/world-africa- 18779726 (providing, among others, the response of Mike Davis, from the human
rights organization Global Witness, who said that "the sentencing of Lubanga was an 'important devel-
opment' but that it sounded like 'a rather low sentence in relation to the crimes he committed').
11. See infra Part III.
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diversity is reflected in the disparate sentencing practices of international courts
discussed in Section B.
A. Comparative Sentence Severity in National Systems
Sentence severity norms vary considerably around the world. For in-
stance, sentencing law and practice in the United States are widely considered
harsh. 12 In the past several decades, the United States has experienced a "push
for a tough retributivism" that has resulted in longer terms of incarceration. 3 A
notorious example are the "three strikes" laws that mandate life sentences for
repeat offenders, and apply even to nonviolent offenses.14 Sentences in the
United States are approximately five to ten times longer than those imposed in
France for similar crimes.' 5 Early release for good behavior is restricted.' 6 Un-
like much of the rest of the world, the United States continues to apply the
death penalty. Prison conditions in the United States are also notoriously tough,
with rampant violence and overcrowding.' 7 Solitary confinement is wide-
spread. Treatment for addictions, as well as medical and psychological condi-
tions, is limited.'9 Opportunities for self-improvement are rare.2 0
Other countries that are known for inflicting harsh punishment include
China and North Korea, where punishments often include hard labor, and the
death penalty is applied frequently.21 Some countries in the Middle East, for
12. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 4, 46 (2005); see also Michael Tonry, Preface, in
THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT v, v (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (stating that punishment in
the United States today is "vastly harsher than in any other country to which the United States would
normally be compared").
13. WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 56.
14. Id.; Connie de la Vega et al., Cruel and Unusual: U.S. Sentencing Practices in a Global
Context, U.S.F SCH. L., CENTER FOR L. & GLOBAL JUST. 32-34 (May 2012), http://www.usfca.edu
/law/docs /criminalsentencing.
15. WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 57.
16. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2006) (allowing early release credits of only up to fifty-
four days per year served, upon "exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations").
17. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923, 1927 (2011) (taking note of the consider-
able strain that severe overcrowding in California's prison system has placed on prison resources as well
as its tendency to promote prison violence); The Expanding Federal Prison Population, SENT'G
PROJECT 2 (Mar. 2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/incFederalPrisonFactsheet
March2012.pdf (noting that federal prisons are operating at thirty-five percent above capacity, resulting
in double and triple-bunking, and the utilization of "non-housing areas for sleeping quarters").
18. New Amnesty International Report Assails California's Use of Solitary Confinement,
SENT'G L. & POL'Y (Sept. 27, 2012, 9:18 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw and
policy/2012/09/new-amnesty-international-report-assails-californias-use-of-solitary-confinement.html.
19. Nora V. Demleitner, New Voices on the War on Drugs: "Collateral Damage": No Re-
Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1054 n.139 (2002) (noting that "[o]nly 13% of the
seventy to eighty-five percent of state prisoners who need treatment for substance abuse receive it while
imprisoned"); Keramet Reiter, Comment, Experimentation on Prisoners: Persistent Dilemmas in Rights
andRegulations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 501, 538 (2009) (explaining a number of factors that have decreased
access to healthcare for the U.S. prison population); Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Men-
tal Illness, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usal 003/usal 003.pdf
20. See, e.g., Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Pu-
nishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 135-36 (2007) (stating that the "gut-
ting" of rehabilitation programs in the U.S. prison system "perpetuates the disadvantages of incarcerated
person").
21. CLIFF ROBERSON & DILIP K. DAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LEGAL MODELS
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example Iran and Saudi Arabia, are known for inflicting harsh and often deadly
punishments, including stoning. 22 In many African countries, conditions of in-
carceration are very difficult.2 3
At the other end of the spectrum are many countries in Europe and Latin
America where the death penalty is prohibited, terms of imprisonment are
much shorter, and conditions of incarceration are substantially more humane.2 4
In many European countries the maximum terms of incarceration are ten to fif-
teen years.25 Scandinavian prisons are particularly well known for their humane
conditions, including opportunities for education and other forms of self-
improvement.26
A recent example illustrates the differences among norms. A Norwegian
court sentenced Anders Breivik to twenty-one years in prison for killing seven-
ty-seven people, a crime that the prosecution had considered charging as a
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 200-02 (2008); Margaret K. Lewis, Leniency and Severity in China's Death Pe-
nalty Debate, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 303, 304 (2011); Blaine Harden, N. Korea's Hard-Labor Camps:
On the Diplomatic Back Burner, WASH. POST, July 20, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-
07-20/world/36925508_1-camp-guard-hard-labor-political-prisoners (describing the daily lives of North
Korean political prisoners, "[e]ating a diet of mostly com and salt, they lose their teeth, their gums turn
black . . . [m]ost work 12- to 15-hour days"); Stephen Haggard & Marcus Noland, Repression and Pu-
nishment in North Korea: Survey Evidence of Prison Camp Experiences 3 (E.W. Ctr. Working Papers,
Politics, Governance & Sec. Series, Working Paper No. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/pswpO2O.pdf (describing prison experiences
ranging from witnessing forced starvation to beatings and torture).
22. Michael J. Dennis, Human Rights in 2002: The Annual Sessions of the UN Commission on
Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 364, 382 (2003); Five Reasons
Why Saudi Arabia Must Urgently Abolish the Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT'L (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/five-reasons-why-saudi-arabia-must-urgently-abolish-death-penalty-
2013-03-05; Ryan Grenoble, Ali Al-Khawahir, Saudi Man, Sentenced to be Paralyzed in 'Eye for an
Eye' Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013
/04/03/ali-al-khawahir-paralyzed-saudi-arabia n_3009500.html.
23. See, e.g., Benin: Prison Conditions Violate Human Rights, IRIN (July 30, 2008),
http://www.irinnews.org/report/79523/benin-prison-conditions-violate-human-rights (describing "dep-
lorable" conditions in Benin's prisons, including overcrowding, unjustified detention, lack of trained
prison personnel, and inadequate food); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Tanza-
nia, U.S. DEP'T STATE 4-7 (May 24, 2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186460.pdf,
Amanda Dissel, Prison Conditions in Africa, CENTER FOR STUDY VIOLENCE & RECONCILIATION (Sept.
2001), http://ppja.org/regional-infornation/africa/Prison%20Conditions%20Africa.pdf (describing over-
crowding and lack of basic resources such as food and bedding in prisons in Kenya and Uganda).
24. See generally Michael Tonry, Punishment Policies and Patterns in Western Countries, in
SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 3, 4-5 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds.,
2001) [hereinafter Tonry, Punishment Policies] (contrasting the United States with "the rest of the
Western world, which has renounced the death penalty and where prison sentences longer than a few
years are uncommon"); Tapio Lappi-Seppala, Trust, Welfare, and Political Culture: Explaining Differ-
ences in National Penal Policies, 37 CRIME & JUST. 313, 321 (2008) (pointing out that imprisonment is
the most severe sanction available in the industrialized world, except in the United States); John Van
Kesteren, Public Attitudes and Sentencing Policies Across the World, 15 EUR. J. CRIM. POL'Y RES. 25,
42-43 (2009) (explaining that in a study comparing homicide rates as an indicator of overall crime with
imprisonment rates, Ecuador and Colombia were shown to have relatively high crime but low impri-
sonment, suggesting "milder sentencing tariffs"; by comparison, the United States and Singapore were
shown to have relatively low rates of crime, but high rates of imprisonment); de la Vega, supra note 14,
at 29-31 (2012) (finding that Latin America as a region has a lower rate of life without parole sentences
than the world average).
25. See Tonry, Punishment Policies, supra note 24, at 25.
26. See, e.g., Tapio Lappi-Seppili, Penal Policy in Scandinavia, 36 CRIME & JUST. 217, 218
(2007) (discussing the overall leniency in punishment in the Scandinavian countries). See generally John
Pratt, Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess: Part I; The Nature and Roots of Scandi-
navian Exceptionalism, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 119 (2008).
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crime against humanity.27 If Breivik behaves well in prison, he may well be
released early.2 8 Norwegians, including families of the victims, generally ex-
pressed satisfaction with this sentence.29 In contrast, some commentators in the
United States derided the sentence as preposterously low.3 0
Such divergence in sentence severity norms exists with regard to interna-
tional crimes as well as "ordinary" crimes. For instance, genocide resulting in
death yields the death penalty or life imprisonment in Russia but only eight to
twenty-five years' incarceration in Argentina.31 Genocide not resulting in death
is punished by five to fifteen years in prison in Germany and the death penalty
in Nigeria. 3 2
These examples provide a flavor of the wide range of sentence severity
norms around the world. In light of this diversity, it is not surprising that, as the
following Section demonstrates, international courts have yet to establish con-
sistent norms of sentence severity.
B. International Sentencing Law and Practice
No international court since the International Military Tribunals at Nu-
remberg and Tokyo has been permitted to inflict the death penalty.33 Addition-
ally, at the ICC, the maximum term of incarceration is thirty years, except in
cases of extreme gravity.34 Beyond these restrictions, international judges have
wide latitude to determine the severity of the sentences they inflict.35 The
27. Eva Arevuo, Why Norway's Terrorist May Only Be Sentenced to 21 Years, ARTICLE 3 (Ju-
ly 26, 2011), http://www.article-3.com/why-norway%E2%80%99s-terrorist-may-only-be-sentenced-to-
21-years-92640; Hadar Aviram, Breivik Sentenced to 21 Years: Norwegian Justice, CAL.
CORRECTIONAL CRISIS (Aug. 24, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://califomiacorrectionscrisis.blogspot.com/2012
/08/breivik-sentenced-to-2 1 -years-norwegian.html.
28. Why Norway's Worst Mass Killer Will Be Given a Jail Sentence of Only 21 Years. . . and
Could Be on Weekend Parole in Seven, DAILY MAIL: MAIL ONLINE (July 25, 2011),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2018378/Norway-Massacre-Anders-Behring-Breivik-2 1 -years-
jail-most.html.
29. Anders Behring Breivik: Norway Court Finds Him Sane, BBC NEWS: EUR. (Aug. 24,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19365616; Mark Lewis & Sarah Lyall, Norway Mass
Killer Gets the Maximum: 21 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25
/world/europe/anders-behring-breivik-murder-trial.html.
30. See, e.g., Norwegian Killer of 77 Gets 21 Years, RIGHT HANDED COWBOY (Aug. 25,
2012), http://www.texasbrady.com/archives/2292 (calling, in the words of an American blogger, "the
most ridicules [sic] sentence I have ever heard of'); Jeanne Sager, Mass Murderer Anders Breivik's In-
sanely Short Prison 'Sentence' Puts No Value on Life, STIR (Aug. 24, 2012, 10:09 AM),
http://thestir.cafemom.com/in thenews/142485/mass-murderer anders breiviks_insanely (claiming
the sentence is "insanely short" and sends the message that "life in Norway isn't worth the time it takes
to create it").
31. Daniel B. Pickard, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal Court,
20 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 123, 143-44 (1997).
32. Id. at 148.
33. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, art. 24(1), 24(3),
U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute] (limiting punishment to imprisonment and for-
feiture of illegally obtained property); see also, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 77(l)-(2) (limit-
ing punishment to imprisonment and fines).
34. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 77(1).
35. For example, the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia state simply: "The penalty imposed by the Trial
Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment." S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex,
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judges have exercised that discretion in ways that have produced a range of
sentences across the tribunals.
As noted above, the ICC's first sentence is at least arguably on the mild
side-a fourteen-year term of incarceration for the widespread recruitment and
use of child soldiers. 36 The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugos-
lavia (ICTY) has also tended to impose fairly mild sentences, with an average
of fewer than sixteen years in prison.37 Taking into account the nature of the
crimes, most of which involve large-scale violence by political and military
leaders, such sentences align more closely with European severity norms than
with those of other states, such as the United States or China.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has imposed
somewhat longer prison sentences, with an average of more than twenty-two
years.38 The ICTR has also imposed twenty-one life sentences compared to the
ICTY's four.39 Prison sentences at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
have also been relatively high, averaging thirty-eight years and including sen-
tences as long as fifty-two years.40
The severity of international punishment also varies considerably due to
inconsistent practices regarding early release. International court statutes gen-
erally permit offenders to be released well before the end of their sentences.4 1
However, at the ad hoc tribunals, early release may only be granted if the of-
fender is eligible under the law of the state where the offender is incarcerated.42
This leads to significant variation in the severity of sentences because states
have vastly different norms regarding early release.4 3 The ICC Statute corrects
this problem, reserving early release decisions to the exclusive discretion of the
Court." Indeed, the Statute requires judges to consider release after offenders
have served two-thirds of their sentences. 4 5
Finally, because international courts send convicted persons to various
states to serve their sentences, imprisonment conditions vary greatly. Currently,
art. 23(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; ICTY Statute, supra note 33, at art.
24(1). Similarly, the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone states that punishment should be "im-
prisonment for a specified number of years." Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 19(1),
Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
36. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 76 of the Statute, 1107.
37. SILVIA D'ASCOLI, SENTENCING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE APPROACH OF
THE Two AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
215-16 (2011); Alette Smeulers, Barbora Hola & Tom van den Berg, Sixty-Five Years of International
Criminal Justice: The Facts and Figures, 13 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 7, 22 (2013) (placing the average de-
terminate sentence length for the ICTY at 15.9 years).
38. Smeulers et al., supra note 37, at 24.
39. Id. at 23.
40. Id. at 23.
41. SCSL Statute, supra note 35 at art. 23; Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 110; ICTR Sta-
tute, supra note 35, at art. 27; ICTY Statute, supra note 33, at art. 28.
42. ICTR Statute, supra note 35, at art. 27; ICTY Statute, supra note 33, at art. 28.
43. Benjamin Watson, Equal Treatment for Genocidaires: Sentence Enforcement at the ICTY
and ICTR, HUM. RTS. BRIEF: CENTER FOR HUM. RTs. & HUMANITARIAN L. (Aug, 25, 2012),
http://hrbrief.org/2012/08/equal-treatment-for-genocidaires-sentence-enforcement-at-the-icty-and-ictr.
44. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 110(2).
45. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 110(3).
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international offenders are serving sentences in places as diverse as Mali, where
46
conditions of incarceration are extremely tough, and Sweden, where they are
significantly more humane.47
In sum, the severity of international sentences varies greatly both within
and among the courts. Some of the discrepancy may be attributed to the relative
48
seriousness of the crimes the tribunals adjudicate. For example, the ICTR has
focused largely on prosecuting the crime of genocide, which is widely consi-
dered the most serious international crime,4 9 while the ICTY and SCSL have
adjudicated primarily crimes against humanity and war crimes.50 Another factor
might be the physical locations of the tribunals, with the ICTY in Europe fol-
lowing European norms and the other two adhering to African sentencing
norms, which tend to be more severe.5 1 Although the tribunals are international
in their compositions, they address situations in particular states. The judges
therefore likely feel beholden to some extent to the community norms in those
states. Indeed, the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR require those courts to "have
recourse to" the sentencing practices of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, re-
spectively.52
While some of these factors may provide partial explanations for the vari-
ations, as many commentators have noted, the inconsistency and lack of clarity
in international sentencing decisions make it very difficult to determine what is
46. See generally E.V.O. DANKWA, AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S
RIGHTS, MALI PRISONS REVISITED: REPORT ON A VISIT, 27 NOVEMBER-8 DECEMBER 1998 (1999); Press
Release, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, More ICTR Convicts Transferred to Mali and Be-
nin to Serve Their Sentences (July 3, 2012), available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx
?id=1301.
47. See Hanns von Hofer & Ryan Marvin, Sweden, in IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND
TOMORROW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND PRISON CONDITIONS 634,
636-37 (Dirk van Zyl Smit & Frieder Dtnkel eds., 2d ed. 2001) (describing prison conditions in Swe-
den); Lizette Alvarez, Escapes Lead Sweden to Rethink Liberal Prison System, NY TIMES, Mar. 20,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/20/international/europe/20stockholm.html (pointing out that
Sweden, like much of Scandinavia, prides itself on the humane treatment of prisoners, and provides
amenities such as routine conjugal visits, unlocked cell doors, and television sets in every cell).
48. D'ASCOLI, supra note 37, at 218-20; see also James Meernik & Kimi King, The Sentenc-
ing Determinants of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Empirical and
Doctrinal Analysis, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 717, 735 tbl.I (2003) (noting that of thirty-five convictions,
only one was for genocide; the rest were for war crimes and crimes against humanity).
49. Although this view is pervasive in the general public, there is some authority in interna-
tional criminal law for the proposition that no hierarchy of international crimes exists. See, e.g., Prosecu-
tor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-A bis, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals, 69 (Jan. 26,
2000).
50. , See Barbora Hold, Catrien Bijleveld & Alette Smeulers, Consistency ofInternational Sen-
tencing: ICTYandICTR Case Study, 9 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 539, 549 (2012).
51. Compare Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy
Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1731-32 (2006) (explaining that the death penalty and life without parole
are too harsh for most European countries), with John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision: The En-
lightenment, America's Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J. L. SOC. POL'Y 195, 252
n.407 (2009) (noting that the death penalty is still used in Africa and that some African countries even
employ it for sexual offences).
52. ICTR Statute, supra note 35, at art. 23(1); ICTY Statute, supra note 33, at art. 24(1). The
SCSL statute permits reference not only to the sentencing norms of Sierra Leone, but also to the sentenc-
ing practices of the ICTR. SCSL Statute, supra note 35, at art. 19(1). See Jens David Ohlin, Proportion-
al Sentences at the ICTY, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 322, 323 (Bert Swart et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Ohlin, Proportional Sen-
tences].
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driving sentence severity at these courts.53 What is clear is that uniform norms
of international sentence severity have yet to emerge.
III. THE CALL FOR HARSH JUSTICE
Virtually all scholars who have advanced normative arguments regarding
sentence severity at international courts invoke one or more punishment theo-
ries to urge such courts to impose harsher sentences. In particular, a number of
retributivists argue that international crimes are so serious that only harsh pu-
nishment adequately reflects the offenders' desert. A smaller number of scho-
lars argue that harsh punishment is necessary to accomplish utilitarian objec-
tives such as crime prevention and reconciliation. Finally, some scholars
combine the two arguments, asserting both that perpetrators of international
crimes deserve harsh punishment and that such punishment is necessary to
achieve crime prevention. This Part sets forth these arguments and explains
why each theory fails to support the push for harsh international punishment. It
shows that, although the theories have been the subjects of worldwide debate
for centuries, none has yet been able to justify particular amounts of punish-
ment for international crimes.
A. Retributive Arguments
The most vocal advocates of harshness in international punishment in-
voke retributive theories. Retributive proportionality theory holds that punish-
ment should be calibrated to the perpetrator's desert. Desert is a function of the
harm the offender caused and the offender's culpability for that harm.54 For re-
tributivists, the more serious the crime in terms of harm and culpability, the
more punishment is deserved.55
Retributivists have debated whether desert justifies punishment in a car-
dinal or ordinal sense.56 That is, whether desert tells us precisely what amount
of punishment is appropriate for an offender or merely places the offender in
appropriate relationship to other offenders on the punishment scale. If desert is
53. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International
Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REv. 415, 441 (2001) (claiming that the tribunals' inconsistent sen-
tencing practices "reinforce the views of critics who view the enforcement of international criminal law
as fatally arbitrary"); Ralph Henham, Developing Contextualized Rationales for Sentencing in Interna-
tional Criminal Trials, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 757, 760-61 (2007).
54. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amend-
ment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571, 622 (2005) [hereinafter Frase, Ex-
cessive].
55. Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 568 n.31 (2003). Retributive theories place different
amounts of weight on harm and culpability in measuring desert. See Adil Ahmad Haque, Retributivism:
The Right andthe Good, 32 L. & PHIL. 59,61 (2013).
56. See Paul Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REv. I (1987);
Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 55, 79-83
(1992) [hereinafter von Hirsch, Proportionality]. The United States Supreme Court has employed both
relative and absolute conceptions of retributive culpability in its sentencing jurisprudence. See Joseph L.
Hoffmann, On the Perils ofLine-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229
(1989) (discussing the use of cardinal and ordinal concepts by the Supreme Court).
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merely an ordinal concept, some other norm is needed to anchor the punish-
ment scale. The anchoring norms, rather than desert, determine whether pu-
nishment is overall harsh or mild in a given system.
Early retributivists believed that desert could answer the question of how
much punishment is appropriate in a cardinal sense. They emphasized harm and
argued that proportionate punishment requires inflicting the same harm on the
offender that he or she inflicted on the victim. This notion of "lex talionis" is
reflected in the biblical mandate of "an eye for an eye,"57 as well as similar
statements in the Qur'an .58 Immanuel Kant, the secular philosopher most fam-
ous for endorsing retributive proportionality, hewed to the religious tradition of
measuring desert in cardinal terms.S9 For Kant, appropriate punishments could
be identified without reference to an anchored punishment scale.
Modem retributive theorists, however, have largely abandoned the claim
that desert is a principle of cardinal proportionality. Indeed, many retributivists
believe that crime and punishment are essentially incommensurable. 60 As a re-
sult, retributive proportionality has largely been reduced to an ordinal con-
cept.61 Some retributive scholars, including, most prominently, Andrew von
Hirsch, seek to identify moral principles of harm and culpability to drive the
ordinal ranking of crimes. 62 Others, in particular Paul Robinson, argue that
people share intuitions regarding the relative seriousness of crimes, which
supply the relevant ranking criteria.6 3
Regardless of their approach to ordinal ranking, however, most retributiv-
57. The Biblical maxim of lex talionis reads: "If any harm follows, then you shall give life for
life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, bum for bum, wound for wound, stripe for
stripe." Exodus 21:23-21:25.
58. Qur'an 5:45.
59. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 105 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
60. See Michael Tonry, Individualizing Punishments, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS
ON THEORY AND POLICY 354, 356 (Andrew Ashworth, Andrew von Hirsch & Julian V. Roberts eds.,
2009) (stating that while "rigid retributivists" advocate cardinal proportionality, "subtler retributivists . .
. admit that in the abstract we can never agree on the single ideally appropriate punishment for any
crime"). Even under lex talionis, cardinal proportionality is difficult for many crimes. For example, an
accidental killing might require punishment short of death. H.L.A. Hart and Oliver Wendell Holmes
struggled with proportionality due to the incomparability of crime and punishment. See Youngjae Lee,
Why Proportionality Matters, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1844 (2012).
61. Nonetheless, efforts to identify a cardinal basis for deserved punishment are ongoing. For
instance, Richard Lippke, after noting that retributivists seem to "despair" of anchoring the punishment
scale, has recently proposed what he terms the "commensurate harms principle." Richard L. Lippke,
Anchoring the Sentencing Scale: A Modest Proposal, 16 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 463, 465 (2012).
This principle seeks to justify punishment by calibrating it to the standard harms the offender's crime
inflicts on victims as opposed to the harms actually inflicted. Id. at 465-66. As Professor Lippke admits,
the theory is an incomplete solution in that it fails to take account of the offender's culpability. Id. at
466.
62. See von Hirsch, Proportionality, supra note 56, 81-82 (laying out these moral justifica-
tions).
63. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions ofJustice: Implications for Criminal Law
and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007); Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance
and Conflict in Intuitions ofJustice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1892 (2007); Paul H. Robinson, Robert
Kurzban & Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1687
(2007). But see Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & David A. Hoffman, Some Realism about Punishment
Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531 (2010) (challenging the idea of shared intuitions of deserved pu-
nishment).
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ists rely on community norms to anchor the punishment scale. 64 While desert
determines the appropriate amount of punishment for each crime in relation to
other crimes, community norms govern whether punishments are mild, mod-
erate, or severe.
Retributive international criminal law scholars, on the other hand, seem
largely to eschew community norms as a basis for anchoring punishment and
rely instead on a cardinal notion of desert.65 Jens Ohlin is the most vocal advo-
cate of a cardinally retributive approach to international sentencing. 66 Professor
Ohlin views retribution as the only legitimate goal of international punishment:
"Given that the usual consequentialist rationales for punishment do not apply
with enough force in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity, the choice
is either to recognize the uniquely retributive goal of those prosecutions or to
simply let the criminals go free."67 According to Professor Ohlin, desert can
and should be measured in cardinal terms rather than merely as a matter of rela-
tive ordering. In fact, he criticizes the ICTY for improperly focusing on or-
dinal proportionality.69 When ICTY sentencing decisions invoke retribution to
justify sentences, they tend to do so by attempting to place defendants in the
proper hierarchy of punishment based on relative desert. Professor Ohlin argues
that this approach has resulted in inappropriately low sentences. 70
Professor Ohlin's cardinal approach to proportionality leads him to argue
64. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deonto-
logical, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 162 (2008) [hereinafter Robinson, Competing Concep-
tions]; von Hirsch, Proportionality, supra note 56, at 77 (describing the anchoring points of the punish-
ment scale as a "convention").
65. An exception is Robert Sloane who argues for an ordinally retributive approach to propor-
tionality to effectuate expressive goals. Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Pu-
nishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43
STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 83 (2007).
66. Professor Ohlin has written four pieces of scholarship advocating a retributive approach to
proportionality in international sentencing: Ohlin, Proportional Sentences, supra note 52; Jens David
Ohlin, Commentary: Hassan Ngeze v. Prosecutor, in 24 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 938 (Andr6 Klip & Gdran Sluiter eds., 2009) (discussing a motion by
ICTR defendants for reconsideration of sentences based on disparity with ICTY sentencing); Ohlin, To-
wards a Unique Theory, supra note 1; and Jens David Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of
Genocide, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (2005) [hereinafter Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty].
67. Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory, supra note 1, at 398.
68. Id. at 407-08.
69. Ohlin, Proportional Sentences, supra note 52, at 328. Professor Ohlin calls cardinal pro-
portionality "offense-relative proportionality" and ordinal proportionality "defendant-relative" propor-
tionality. However, he acknowledges that the concepts are identical. Id. at 324 n. 10 (citing ANDREW
VON HIRSCH, PART OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF
CRIMINALS 43 (1985)). Professor Ohlin states that he prefers to avoid the terms "ordinal" and "cardinal"
on the grounds that they assume there is no conflict between the two kinds of proportionality, which he
disputes. Id. The difficulty with Professor Ohlin's terms, however, is that they obscure the question of
how to assess desert. Most retributivists include in calculations of desert factors related to the crimes
(harm) and the offender (culpability); it is not clear whether Professor Ohlin intends to diverge from this
approach.
70. Professor Ohlin addresses the indeterminacy critique that has convinced many retributiv-
ists to reject cardinal proportionality in favor of ordinal. Ohlin, Proportional Sentences, supra note 52,
at 328-31. He acknowledges that the problem has led some theorists to argue that cardinal proportionali-
ty should provide an upper limit to punishment, but that the amount of punishment awarded should be
measured in ordinal terms. Id. at 329-30. In response he states that the goal of the concept of proportio-
nality "is to suggest the kind of punishment that is warranted by virtue of the defendant's wrongdoing."
Id. at 330. It should thus be able to answer questions about upper and lower limits of punishment. Id.
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that international courts should "sentence offenders based on the inherent gravi-
ty of their offence, even if that requires identical sentences (such as life in pris-
on) for dissimilar crimes."71 The justification for this cardinal approach, ac-
cording to Professor Ohlin, is that it is necessary to vindicate the "rule of
law." 72
Professor Ohlin further argues that only harsh punishment adequately in-
flicts retribution for international crimes.73 He asserts that harsh punishment is
necessary in light of the gravity of such crimes. Sentences must be long and
served in uncomfortable conditions. 74 When international sentences are too
short or the conditions of incarceration are too comfortable, "genocidal crimi-
nals are getting away with murder."75 Indeed, the failure of international courts
to endorse a retributive approach has resulted in sentences that "may fail to re-
flect the moral and legal gravity of the offences involved." 7 6 Professor Ohlin
has even argued in support of allowing the death penalty for genocide in light
of the extreme seriousness of that crime.
While Professor Ohlin has developed the argument for cardinally retribu-
tive international punishment in greatest detail, other scholars have implicitly
adopted this approach in their work. For instance, in an article about the relev-
ance of an offender's "good deeds" to sentencing decisions, Jean Galbraith ar-
gues that a certain amount of retribution is "due" to both the individual victims
of international crimes and the groups to which they belong. Although she
does not explain how courts should measure the amount of retribution owed,
she seems to adopt a cardinal approach in advocating for "a rough comparison
between the defendant's crimes and good deeds."79 A good deed directed at a
member of the victim's group (but not the victim herself) only partly mitigates
a crime of equal magnitude, because it reduces the amount of retribution owed
to the group but not to the victim.so Mitigation should be based on the "objec-
tive value" of the good deed to the group.81 Moreover, Professor Galbraith im-
plies that most international sentences should be severe, stating: "The crimes
committed by most international criminal defendants are typically so heinous
71. See id. at 328.
72. Id. at 338. As Professor Ohlin notes several times in making this argument, the justifica-
tion sounds quite similar to a utilitarian argument for deterrence.
73. Id. at 410 ("[E]ven the highest sentence - life in prison - may be inadequate to represent
the moral gravity of some offences, especially in cases dealing with the highest perpetrators for crimes
of genocide and crimes against humanity.").
74. Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory, supra note 1, at 385.
75. Id. at 396.
76. Id. at 390.
77. Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 768-69 ("It is unclear, however, why
the expressive theory of punishment would require forgoing the death penalty in all cases . . . If the
crime is as severe as genocide, only extreme forms of punishment may adequately express society's
condemnation of the evil act.").
78. Jean Galbraith, The Good Deeds ofInternational Criminal Defendants, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 799, 811 (2012).
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that their good deeds are unlikely to merit significant mitigating effect."82
Shahram Dana also endorses a largely retributive approach to internation-
al sentencing in arguing that international courts have failed to do justice in
their quest to accomplish dubious "consequentialist aspirations. He implies a
cardinal view of proportionality in arguing that the punishment international
courts have inflicted have often been too low to reflect adequately the offend-
84 85ers' culpability.84 Others have written in a similar vein.
None of these retributivist scholars has identified a principled way of de-
termining how much punishment people who commit international crimes de-
serve. Instead, they simply invoke the gravity of international crimes to justify
the claim that harsh punishment is required. Yet, as demonstrated above, there
is no consensus either at the international level or among national systems
about how much punishment is appropriate, even for the gravest crimes. In-
stead, the appropriate severity of punishment depends largely on prevailing
norms in the relevant community. The retributive international criminal law
scholarship, much of which is written by U.S. scholars, seems to draw on U.S.
sentence-severity norms. For the reasons elaborated below, such norms are not
appropriate for international courts.
B. Utilitarian Arguments
Although their arguments are less developed than Professor Ohlin's retri-
butivism, some scholars invoke utilitarian goals to advocate for international
punishment that is harsh, or at least harsher than current practice.86 Utilitarian
theorists consider punishment appropriate when the benefits it yields outweigh
its social costs. The eighteenth-century theorist Cesare Beccaria thus endorsed
the principle of parsimony, which requires that punishment be no more severe
than necessary to accomplish the desired ends,87 and Jeremy Bentham elabo-
rated several additional rules of utilitarian proportionality.88 Modern theorists
have built on this legacy. 8 9
82. Id.
83. Dana, supra note 1.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Steven Glickman, Note, Victims' Justice: Legitimizing the Sentencing Regime of
the International Criminal Court, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 229, 247-48 (2004) ("A review of the
sentences issued by the ICTY and ICTR reveals that, although the Trial Chambers of both Tribunals
stressed retribution as a primary justification for punishment, most of the sentences handed down by the
ICTY were far too lenient to actually reflect this rationale").
86. See, e.g., D'ASCOL1, supra note 37, at 37 (invoking restorative justice); Harmon & Gay-
nor, supra note 1, at 711-12 ("Low sentences, however well intentioned, not only weaken respect for
human dignity and the rule of law, but may frustrate and impede reconciliation in the areas in which the
crimes were committed."); Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations ofInternational Criminal Law,
12 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 65 (2001) (invoking deterrence).
87. See CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 49 (Jane Grigson trans., Marsilio
Publishers 1996) (1764) ("Punishments, therefore, and the method of inflicting them, should be chosen
in due proportion to the crime so as to make the most efficacious and lasting impression on the minds of
men, and the least painful impressions on the body of the criminal.").
88. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 165-71 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (1789).
89. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
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The ends utilitarians seek to promote through punishment include specific
and general deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and norm expression. Of
these, the most commonly relied upon in international sentencing decisions is
deterrence, 9 0 although some decisions also invoke the other three aforemen-
tioned ends.91
Unlike most desert-based theories of punishment, deterrence theories
claim the ability to justify absolute amounts of punishment. Thus, theorists
such as Richard Posner posit that the "optimal" amount of punishment can be
ascertained for particular crimes. 92 This economic approach to punishment as-
sumes that most potential offenders are rational calculators who decide whether
to commit crimes according to the severity of the punishment in relation to the
benefit they anticipate from the crimes, as well as the likelihood of being pu-
nished.93
The assumptions on which deterrence theories are based have been wide-
ly challenged in the literature on international criminal law.94 More importantly
for present purposes, none of the scholars who invoke such theories to advocate
for harsh international punishment have sought to explain or justify the claim
that such punishment is necessary to deter international crimes. Nor do the cha-
racteristics of international crimes support that notion. Perpetrators of genocide
and crimes against humanity generally claim, and probably often believe, that
their actions are morally appropriate. 95 They claim to be upholding a principle
LAW 173 n.20 (2008) (stating that "the law should not inflict greater suffering than it is likely to pre-
vent"); Frase, Excessive, supra note 54, at 592-97 (identifying two utilitarian proportionality principles:
ends proportionality and means proportionality); Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 67, 72-73 (2005) (stating, in discussing utilitarianism, that "[c]riminal penalties should not cost
more than the benefits they achieve or cause individual or social harms which outweigh their crime-
controlling effects or other benefits. Punishment should also be efficient. Penalties should not be more
severe or more costly than necessary; if the same crime-control and other benefits can be achieved with
less severe or less costly methods, those methods should be preferred.").
90. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, $$ 2128-29 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010) (affirming the ICTY's commitment to deterrence); Pros-
ecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Sentencing Judgment, 1 16 (July 19, 2007) (noting that con-
sideration of deterrence in sentencing reaffirms the international community's intolerance of serious
breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR
97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 1 28 (Sept. 4, 1998) (justifying a sentence of life imprisonment in part
by stating that would-be perpetrators of mass atrocity must be dissuaded through punishment that de-
monstrates that the global community is not prepared to tolerate serious violations of international crim-
inal law).
91. See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 93 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003) (recognizing the goal of reconciliation); Prosecutor v.
Blalkic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 765 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3,
2000) (recognizing the goal of rehabilitation); Stuart Beresford, Unshackling the Paper Tiger - the Sen-
tencing Practices of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwan-
da, I INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 33, 90 (2001) (describing the utilitarian sentencing goals of the ICTY and
ICTR).
92. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1205-06 (1985).
93. Id. at 1205 (stating that the theory begins with the assumption that most criminals are suf-
ficiently rational actors).
94. See, e.g., David S. Koller, The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer, 40 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1019, 1027-30 (2008) (discussing various criticisms of deterrence in international crim-
inal law).
95. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International Criminal
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or protecting a group. They are usually in positions of power. If international
criminal law can influence such actors, it is most likely to do so through strong
expression of contrary values, not by inflicting long sentences. Although token
punishment is probably insufficient to express adequate condemnation of se-
rious crimes, neither is harsh punishment necessary. If a leader like Syria's Ba-
shar Assad is to be deterred by the threat of international punishment, a highly
debatable proposition to be sure, he is just as likely to be deterred by a possible
ten- or fifteen-year sentence as by the threat of a life sentence.
C. Utility ofDesert
A final set of arguments for harshness invokes both utilitarian and retribu-
tive theories, claiming that there is utility in giving offenders their just
deserts.96 A number of scholars, most prominently Paul Robinson, argue that
humans share intuitions about desert and that failing to adhere to these intui-
tions undermines the law's ability to achieve socially beneficial outcomes such
as deterrence.97 Most advocates of the utility of desert theory, including Profes-
sor Robinson, view desert as providing guidance only regarding ordinal propor-
tionality.98 They rely on community norms rather than shared intuitions to de-
termine the overall harshness or mildness of the punishment scale. 99
Jens Ohlin's argument for a cardinally retributive approach to interna-
tional sentencing, however, also includes an appeal to the beneficial conse-
quences of such retribution. 00 Without explicitly endorsing the utility of desert
thesis, with its focus on ordinal proportionality, Ohlin argues that if sentences
are too low victims may "engage in self-help measures and take matters into
their own hands."10  He further states: "If the retributive goals are ignored, vic-
tims lose confidence in the system, the guilty are not adequately punished, the
moral fabric to the international community is not repaired, ethnic conflict
reignites, and the twin goals of collective peace and security, as codified in the
Law, 12 FINNIsH Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 253 (2001) (arguing that perpetrators of international crimes tend to
believe that history will vindicate their actions and are motivated by a belief that their actions are
"good"); Sloane, supra note 65, at 81 (arguing that internationally criminal conduct often conforms "to a
norm that prevails within the criminal's literal community, be it national, ethnic, racial or martial"); Da-
vid Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
473, 477 (2009) (discussing a survey conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross that
demonstrated that war criminals and civilians in Bosnia did not view their attacks on other civilians as
wrongful, because they viewed the situation as "total war"); Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments &
International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 633, 654-56 (2012) (arguing that the
unique circumstances surrounding international crimes include the fact that perpetrators adhere to their
own social norms such that desert based on violation of "community norms" becomes impractical).
96. See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 63, at 1848; see also Robinson & Darley, supra note
63, at 18-31 (arguing that there is great utility in the criminal justice system that provides for a distribu-
tion of liability and punishment in accordance with the citizens' shared intuitions about justice); Robin-
son, Kurzban & Jones, supra note 63, at 1635 (referring to the theory of utility of desert).
97. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 63, at 1892; see also Woods, supra note 95, at 651-52
(arguing that the theory is inapplicable in the international criminal law context).
98. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 63, at 12-13.
99. See Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 64, at 162; Robinson & Darley, supra
note 63, at 45-46.
100. Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory, supra note 1, at 399-400.
101. Id.
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UN Charter, are not respected.,
102
As with his arguments based on general retributive theory, Professor Oh-
lin does not explain why harsh punishment is necessary to achieve these conse-
quences. Again, the argument seems to draw on the harsh sentencing norms
typical of the United States.
Each of the arguments described above fails to supply a convincing theo-
retical basis for harsh international punishment. Theories focused on desert at
most explain why crimes and punishments should be ranked according to se-
riousness; they do not answer the question whether punishment should be
harsh, moderate, or mild overall. Likewise, utilitarian theories, which always
encounter problems of counterfactual proof, are particularly problematic in the
context of international crimes.
Calls for harsh international justice are not solely rooted in theory, how-
ever. Much of the commentary seems to rely instead on the intuition that inter-
national crimes are so serious that they require harsh punishment, whatever the
purpose of that punishment. As the next Part explains, this often-invoked intui-
tion can be misleading, making it especially important for international judges
to look beyond intuition to guiding norms in determining appropriate sentences.
IV. DON'T TRUST YOUR INTUITIONS: RHETORIC, NARRATIVE, AND
THE RISK OF OVERPUNISHING FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
The implicit assumption in much of the commentary that international
crimes are so serious as to make harsh punishment intuitively appropriate is
dangerous for at least two reasons. First, and most importantly, there is no evi-
dence that humans share intuitions about the appropriate punishment severity
for any crime. As explained above, scholars who advocate an empirical ap-
proach to desert such as Professor Robinson, argue that humans share intuitions
about how much punishment is deserved for particular crimes relative to other
crimes, not about the appropriate severity of punishment in absolute terms.' 03
Instead, our intuitions about appropriate punishment severity seem to be de-
rived from the norms of the communities to which we belong. 104
The second reason to be wary of the implicit appeal to intuition is more
specific to international crimes. The discourse surrounding international crimes
is replete with rhetoric and narratives that risk misleading sentencing decision-
makers about the gravity of these crimes. Decisionmakers who rely on their in-
tuitive sense of the gravity of international crimes to determine punishment se-
verity therefore risk overpunishing. That is, they risk inflicting harsher
punishments than they would impose if they understood more clearly the reality
of the crimes, unencumbered by the rhetoric and narratives.
102. Id.
103. See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 63, at 1892; Paul H. Robinson, The Proper Role of
the Community in Determining Criminal Liability and Punishment, UNIV. PA. L. SCH., PENN L.: LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 9 (Nov. 21, 2012), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi
?article=1433&context-facultyscholarship.
104. See Robinson, Kurzban & Jones, supra note 63, at 1677-78; Mark Warr et al., Norms,
Theories of Punishment, and Publicly Preferred Penalties for Crimes, 24 SOc. Q. 75, 90 (1983).
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While the potentially distorting effects of rhetoric and narrative are not
unique to international criminal law,105 they are especially acute in this context
in light of the physical, political, and cultural distance between international
courts and the crimes they adjudicate. The greater the distance between deci-
sionmakers and the lived reality of crimes, the more likely decisionmakers are
to be improperly influenced by misleading rhetoric and narratives.' 06
A. Gravity Rhetoric
As Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner have stated, "'[R]hetorics' . .
denote the various linguistic processes by which a speaker can create, address,
avoid, or shape issues that the speaker wishes or is called upon to contest, or
that a speaker suspects (at some level of awareness) may become contested." 0 7
In the context of international criminal law, an important contested issue is the
appropriateness of international jurisdiction. Criminal jurisdiction is generally
considered integral to the right of sovereign states to govern within their territo-
ries. Invocations of international jurisdiction over criminal conduct therefore
require special justification.
Since the emergence of international criminal law following the Holo-
caust, the primary justification for such jurisdiction has been the special gravity
of the crimes at issue.o International criminal law is said to deal with atroci-
ties, heinous offenses, crimes that violate humanity, and so on.109 The Rome
Statute preamble frames the project of the Court by reference to "unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity."i 0 Less serious crimes
crimes are to be left to national adjudication. In light of this important justifica-
tory role, gravity rhetoric has become pervasive in international criminal law
discourse.' 11
Despite its omnipresence, international criminal law's gravity rhetoric has
gone largely unexamined. 112  As Amsterdam and Bruner point out,
105. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 111-13 (2000)
(discussing the effects of narrative on law in general).
106. See id. at 14-15 (suggesting that narrative and rhetoric are influenced by culture, so the
farther away from the culture one gets, the more the narrative and rhetoric of that culture cannot proper-
ly be understood).
107. Id. at 165.
108. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 157 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (holding
that the jurisdiction of the international tribunal was justified in part because "of the nature of the of-
fences alleged against Appellant, offences which, if proven, do not affect the interests of one State alone
but shock the conscience of mankind"); BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE & THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 10 (2003); Marga-
ret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1400, 1401-02 (2009).
109. See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, The Future ofAtrocity Law, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
389, 394-96 (2002) (describing the types of crimes dealt with in international criminal tribunals).
110. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl.
11l. See, e.g., Andrea Carcano, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offense in International
Criminal Law, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 583 (2002).
112. deGuzman, How Serious, supra note 3, at 22.
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"[U]nexamined rhetorics can make trouble." 13 Such rhetorics can "narrow the
range of discursive space and interpretive possibility.""14 Narrowing effects
have been demonstrated in the literature on the impact of various heuristics and
biases on legal decisionmaking." 5 For example, Alice Ristroph has examined
the limiting effects of "violence" rhetoric on efforts at criminal law reform in
the United States.
Scholars advocating harshness deploy gravity rhetoric to narrow the range
of sentencing choices available to international courts. Yet the rhetoric is some-
times misleading. As I have elaborated elsewhere, international crimes are not
uniformly as serious as the rhetoric suggests, and the scope of international
criminal law is expanding to include increasingly less serious offenses and less
responsible offenders.'17
The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC extends to isolated war crimes
committed by individual soldiers." The harms associated with some war
crimes, such as pillaging or directing attacks at protected buildings, can be ra-
ther minor in some cases. 119 Even crimes against humanity are being inter-
preted in the jurisprudence to embrace increasingly less serious harms.120
Moreover, even when the harms associated with international crimes are
very serious, the culpability of the perpetrators may be relatively low. By hig-
hlighting the harms victims have suffered, gravity rhetoric can obscure or ex-
aggerate the extent of the perpetrator's culpability. National criminal laws gen-
erally presume that when a person intentionally or knowingly causes great
harm, the person's culpability is commensurately high absent exceptional cir-
cumstances.121 For several reasons, however, this presumption is questionable
in international criminal law, where the offender's culpability may be lower
than one would normally expect.
First, as commentators beginning with Hannah Arendt have noted, unlike
113. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 105, at 192.
114. Id. at 193.
115. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (discussing how heuristics can lead to errors in particular circumstances); Gre-
gory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Pa-
tent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1393 (2006) (finding that hindsight bias distorts patent
decisions "far more than anticipated").
116. Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571, 575
(2011).
117. See generally deGuzman, How Serious, supra note 3.
118. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 8.
119. Id., at art. 8(2)(b).
120. See Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgement, 388-95 (Dec. 2, 2008),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CBikindi%5Cjudgement%5CO81202eludgement.p
df (ruling controversially that hate speech can constitute persecution as a crime against humanity); Pros-
ecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, 1 1072 (Dec. 12, 2003),
http://www.unictr.orgfPortals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CNahimana%5Cjudgement%5Cjudg&sent.pdf;
deGuzman, How Serious, supra note 3, at 38-44; Patricia M. Wald, Genocide and Crimes Against Hu-
manity, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 621, 629 (2007) (noting that judges have broadly interpreted
"widespread" to include an area as small as twenty kilometers).
121. See Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1, 3
(2012) (stating that "[t]he law typically treats an actor who knows that he or she will likely cause serious
harm to a particular individual, and who does cause that harm, as a very culpable wrongdoer who merits
a severe sanction").
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"ordinary" crimes, international crimes are often committed in accordance
with, rather than in violation of, prevailing social and sometimes legal
norms.122 While leaders who shape the aberrant normative environment deserve
strong sanction, the culpability of norm followers may be lower than the gravi-
ty rhetoric surrounding international crimes suggests. 2 3
A related problem is that some norms of international criminal law re-
main in early stages of development. With regard to such norms, culpability
may be reduced even for leaders.124 An important recent example concerns the
prohibition on recruiting and using child soldiers-the crimes of which Thomas
Lubanga was convicted.125 These crimes have been identified as international
crimes relatively recently. They were first included in an international court sta-
tute in 1998,126 and only a handful of offenders have been prosecuted for them.
Lubanga was the first defendant tried at the ICC for these crimes.
Lubanga may well have been unaware that recruiting and using child sol-
diers in armed conflict were crimes under international law. More importantly,
however, he may have been unaware that what he was doing was immoral.'
Lubanga was operating in a cultural context in which children are expected to
contribute to family and social welfare at an earlier age than in some other parts
of the world.12 8 As such, requiring or permitting children to participate in
armed conflict may have seemed less reprehensible to him than it does to many
others.
This is not to say that the international community's decision to punish
Lubanga is illegitimate. The norms prohibiting his crimes were incorporated
into the Rome Statute to which Lubanga's state, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, is a party. However, it does suggest that the ICC should be careful that
the gravity rhetoric surrounding these crimes does not result in overly harsh
122. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 287-
88 (1963); Mark A. Drumbl, Accountability for System Criminality, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 373,
375 (2010) [hereinafter Drumbl, Accountability].
123. See, e.g., Drumbl, Accountability, supra note 122; Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence
and Individual Punishment: The Criminality ofMass Atrocity, 99 N.W. L. REV. 539, 571-72 (2005) [he-
reinafter Drumbl, Collective Violence] (explaining the phenomenon of international criminal prosecu-
tions wherein an offender is a "captive[] of [a] social norm[]" and thus with a weakened sense of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility receives what might be considered a lenient sentence despite being found
guilty of crimes considered the most serious to the international community).
124. Joseph E. Kennedy has noted that in the United States, sentence discretion has served to
mitigate the injustice of applying new norms to defendants operating under the old ones. Joseph E. Ken-
nedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 754 (2002).
125. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to
Article 76 of the Statute, 107.
126. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi).
127. See David M. Rosen, Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, and the Globaliza-
tion of Childhood, 109 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST, 298, 300, 304 (2007) (calling into question the prevail-
ing humanitarian narrative of child-soldiering as a moral affront due to its lack of consideration for the
context surrounding the recruitment and use of child soldiers in modem conflicts); Ah-Jung Lee, Under-
standing and Addressing the Phenomenon of 'Child Soldiers': The Gap between the Global Humanita-
rian Discourse and the Local Understandings and Experiences of Young People's Military Recruitment
14-19 (Refugee Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 52, 2009) (calling for a more critical examination of
child soldiering given the international community's failure to take into account local understandings of
a child's role in a community during times of peace versus war).
128. Ah-Jung Lee, supra note 127, at 16.
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punishment.
The distortive effect of gravity rhetoric on punishment remains a potential
problem. At this stage in the regime's development there is little evidence that
gravity rhetoric is in fact promoting harsh punishments. Indeed, current practice
suggests that at least some judges are resistant to the rhetoric. As noted above,
Lubanga was sentenced to fourteen years in prison despite the prosecution's
recommendation of thirty years based on the purported seriousness of the
crimes. The ICTY has likewise imposed many sentences at the mild end of the
spectrum. Professor Ohlin attributes the lenient sentences at the ICTY to a mis-
guided focus on relative, rather than absolute, desert.12 9 An equally plausible
explanation, however, is that judges are focusing on absolute desert but finding
that the culpability of defendants does not merit severe sentences.
As the ICC continues to develop its sentencing practice, it should be care-
ful to avoid imposing sentences based on the rhetoric rather than the reality of
crime seriousness. The Prosecutor's argument in the Lubanga case that all ICC
crimes should be subject to a baseline presumption of twenty-four years in light
of their gravity illustrates the problem. 130 To adopt such a presumption would
reinforce the risk of bias inherent in gravity rhetoric. 13 1
B. Narratives
A related feature of international criminal law that also gives rise to a risk
of overpunishing is the regime's reliance on narratives of monstrosity and bi-
nary narratives of good and evil. A significant body of scholarship recognizes
law and legal process as narrative.132 As Amsterdam and Bruner note, the reso-
lution of legal questions is not simply a matter of "examining free-standing fac-
tual data selected on grounds of their logical pertinency."133 Rather, "answers
in such matters of 'fact' depend largely upon one's choice (considered or un-
considered) of some overall narrative as best describing what happened or how
the world works."1 34
International criminal courts engage in at least two kinds of narratives
that may encourage judges to overpunish. The first is closely related to the dep-
loyment of gravity rhetoric examined above. International courts tell a story
about the extreme evil that offenders perpetrate against their fellow humans,
129. Ohlin, Proportional Sentences, supra note 52, at 327-28.
130. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 76 of the Statute, 192.
131. See Daniel M. Isaacs, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 YALE L.J. 426, 437-39 (2011)
(discussing cognitive biases that may arise from the existence of sentencing baselines that "frame" the
question of sentencing around how a situation is presented, not the situation itself).
132. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 105, at 110; Jane Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law
Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 142, 149 (1997) (arguing that a focus on narrative in law "can be helpful
as a way of elucidating how meaning is made in legal contexts"); Peter Brooks, Narrative Transac-
tions-Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 28 (2006) (calling for greater
attention to the "narrativity" of the law); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEo. L.J.
281, 335 (2013) (recognizing the need for balance between a convincing narrative at trial and fair and
reliable fact-finding, and the importance of this balance to the messages that trials send to the public).
133. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 105, at 111.
134. Id.
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which fosters a sense of community among those supporting an international
response. By portraying offenders as monsters, international criminal law
forges solidarity in the face of cultural differences and appeals to state sove-
reignty.
Narratives of extreme evil or monstrosity evoke emotions of anger and
hatred that encourage severe punishment.3 Joseph Kennedy has examined the
role that such narratives have played in promoting a culture of harsh punish-
ment in the United States.136 Drawing on Emile Durkheim's work, Kennedy
argues that narratives of monstrosity have developed in the United States to
help overcome anxiety based on change and diversity and to increase social co-
hesion.13 7 The results have been "sentences tied to monstrous conceptions of
crime, a sentencing process which attempts to measure only harm and not mor-
al worth, and a mentality of risk assessment which holds our judges and prose-
cutors hostage to our worst fears."l 38 Convicted persons have become scape-
goats, blamed for society's intangible fears and frustrations.13 9
While the narratives of international courts have yet to demonstrate such
an effect on sentencing broadly, there is reason for concern. For instance, the
sentence that the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) imposed on former Li-
berian President Charles Taylor has caused some alarm.14 0 The narrative sur-
rounding the Taylor case was one of a particularly evil individual abusing his
position at the height of political power to inflict atrocious harms on huge
numbers of people. 14 1 The "reality" proven at trial was rather different. Taylor
was not found to have abused his power or to have participated directly in the
criminal enterprise at issue, let alone participated as a leader. Instead, he was
convicted only of accessorial liability.14 2 Nonetheless, Taylor was sentenced to
fifty years imprisonment, the second longest sentence the SCSL has handed
down.143
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have thus far
convicted only one defendant, Kaing Guek Eav, known as "Duch." Duch was
135. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity through Modern
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 845 (2000).
136. Id.at830-31.
137. Id. at 907.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 862.
140. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Taylor Sentencing Judgment: A Critical Analysis, 11 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 835, 852 (2013).
141. See, e.g., The Associated Press, War Crimes Trial Resumes for Former Leader ofLiberia,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/world/africa/08taylor.html; David Blair,
Profile: Charles Taylor, Warlord and Ex-President of Liberia on Trial for War Crimes, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, July 14, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/5818861
/Profile-Charles-Taylor-warlord-and-ex-president-of-Liberia-on-trial-for-war-crimes.html.
142. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgement, 1 6994 (May 18, 2012),
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-=k%2bO3KREEPCQ%3d&tabid=107.
143. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Sentencing Judgement, Disposition (May
30, 2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-U6xCITNg4tY%3D&tabid=107. The longest
determinate sentence handed down by the SCSL was Sesay's fifty-two year sentence. Prosecutor v. Se-
say, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Sentencing Judgement, § VI (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org
/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-mRoVnfyCuFY%3d&tabid=215.
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the commander of the notorious Tuol Sleng prison where he oversaw the tor-
ture of thousands of prisoners before sending them to their deaths in Cambo-
dia's killing fields. 144 Duch pled guilty and asked for forgiveness.14 5 There is
general agreement that Duch was a functionary who would have been replaced,
and probably killed, had he refused to carry out the orders he received. 146De-
spite his guilty plea and remorse, Duch was sentenced to life in prison.14 7 Nota-
bly, it was the appeals court that imposed this sentence. The trial court, which
was closer to the facts and presumably less susceptible to misleading narratives
about the case, had sentenced Duch to thirty-five years imprisonment.
Are these examples of narratives of monstrosity affecting sentences or of
the kind of "scapegoating" that Professor Kennedy has identified in the United
States? As with many questions concerning the appropriateness of particular
sentences, it is difficult to know. However, in light of the role that narratives of
evil and monstrosity play in community building, international courts should be
alert to the possibility that such narratives will result in overpunishment.
The second narrative of international criminal law that may encourage
overpunishment is the identification of participants in conflict as good or evil.
Commentators have described how international criminal law institutions con-
tribute to the development of such binary narratives. For instance, Sarah Nou-
wen and Wouter Werner refer to Carl Schmitt's theory of politics to demon-
strate that the International Criminal Court divides conflict participants into
"friends" and "enemies" of the international community when they decide
whom to prosecute.148 Christopher Mahoney makes a similar argument of polit-
ical motivation with regard to the SCSL, arguing that those who created the
court and guided its functioning manipulated the narrative surrounding the con-
flict in Sierra Leone to suit their agenda.' 49
Participants in conflict, all of whom are likely responsible for serious
crimes, are segregated into allies and enemies of the international community in
its quest for justice. Thus, the Lord's Resistance Army and the government of
Sudan become "evil," and the Ugandan government and Darfuri rebels become
"good." 50 Likewise, these narratives paint the international community broadly
as agents for good, regardless of the morally questionable roles that some of its
144. Prosecutor v. Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgement, 1 249-51, 267 (July
26, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/20100726_JudgementCase
001_ENGPUBLIC.pdf.
145. Prosecutor v. Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgement, 369 (Feb. 3,
2012), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/Case%20001 AppealJudgementEn
.pdf.
146. Prosecutor v. Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgement, 11 555-57.
147. Id. 1 679; Prosecutor v. Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgement, §
VIII.
148. Sarah M.H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The Interna-
tional Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 941,943-44 (2010).
149. Christopher Mahony, Prioritising International Sex Crimes before the Special Court for
Sierra Leone: One More Instrument of Political Manipulation?, in THEMATIC PROSECUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL SEX CRIMES 59, 60 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2012).
150. Nouwen & Werner, supra note 148, at 951-54, 960-61.
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members may have played in the conflict.151
By simplifying complex questions regarding the appropriate allocation of
moral blame, international courts risk exaggerating the culpability of those
deemed enemies of the international community and thus inflicting excess pu-
nishment upon them. Like gravity rhetoric, therefore, the narratives that drive
international criminal law create risks of overpunishment.
In light of these risks, judges should be wary of calls for harsh justice for
all international crimes. Because international judges have wide discretion in
imposing sentences, their intuitions will inevitably influence sentencing out-
comes. To avoid overpunishing, they should keep in mind the potentially dis-
torting effects of international law's gravity rhetoric and narratives of mon-
strosity, good, and evil. Moreover, international judges should be able to look
beyond their intuitions to global sentencing norms to guide their decisions. The
next Part turns to the question of how international courts should begin to iden-
tify such norms.
V. DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL SENTENCE SEVERITY NORMSl 52
Thus far, this Article has argued that the appropriate severity of sentences
for international crimes cannot be derived from existing theories of punishment
and that intuitions may be misleading in light of international criminal law's
rhetoric and narratives. How then should international courts determine sen-
tence severity? This Part argues, first that they should seek to build global sen-
tencing norms rather than apply the national norms of the states where the
crimes occurred. Second, it elaborates the relevance of human rights as a source
of global sentencing norms, showing that they tend to oppose harshness and fa-
vor leniency. Finally, it suggests how international courts can respond to the
objections that will inevitably be voiced if they adopt the recommendation of
lenient sentencing.
A. Why International Norms?
If sentence severity is largely a matter of community norms, what is the
relevant community for purposes of international sentencing? As other com-
mentators have noted, international criminal law is torn between two audiences:
the national communities where crimes are committed and the broader interna-
tional community. 153 The Rome Statute reflects this tension. The preamble im-
151. Id.; Mahony, supra note 149, at 75-80 (explaining that at the SCSL, the first prosecutor
painted the rebel RUF as the sole criminal party and the Sierra Leone government and the international
community, in the form of Britain, as "the good guys").
152. while this Article is limited to addressing how international criminal courts should deter-
mine the overall severity of international punishment norms, an important related question is how such
courts should identify proportionate sentences in particular cases. For a discussion of that issue see Mar-
garet M. deGuzman, A Theory ofProportionality for the International Criminal Court, in THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF CHALLENGES AND
ACHIEVEMENTS (Carsten Stalin ed.) (forthcoming 2014).
153. See, e.g., Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion
and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 583, 658 (2007) (claiming the ICC
"must face the irreducible tension between the policy priorities of the international institution on the one
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plies a global agenda, stating that grave international crimes "threaten the
peace, security and well-being of the world" and that the ICC was created to
help prevent such crimes. At the same time, the statute provides for a signifi-
cant level of victim participation, indicating a desire to meet the needs of the
communities most affected by international crimes.154
The scholarship is similarly divided between those who advocate a large-
ly or entirely cosmopolitan vision of global justice and those who support a
more state-oriented pluralist approach.s55 In the sentencing context, several
scholars, including Alexander Greenawalt, argue that international courts
should apply the sentencing laws of the states that would exercise jurisdiction
in the absence of international action. 156 Likewise, a number of commentators
advocate a victim-centered approach to international criminal law.' Such an
hand, and those of the societies most directly affected by international crimes on the other"); Sloane,
supra note 65, at 41 ("First, unlike national criminal law, ICL purports to serve multiple communities,
including both literal ones-for example, ethnic or national communities-and the figurative 'interna-
tional community,' which, needless to say, is not monolithic; it consists of multiple, often competing,
constituencies and interests.").
154. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at arts. 15(3), 19(3), 43(6), 54(3)(b), 68(3), 75(3), 82(4).
155. See, e.g., Mireille Delmas-Marty, The Contribution of Comparative Law to a Pluralist
Conception ofInternational Criminal Law, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 13, 25 (2003) ("By allowing the ela-
boration of hybrid international concepts and by favouring the harmonization of national criminal sys-
tems, comparative law could help promote a more pluralist conception of international criminal law.
This legal, integrated pluralism would not be synonymous with relativism, but compatible with univer-
salism, without the risk of hegemonic universalism based on an imperialist model."); Drumbl, Collective
Violence, supra note 123, at 610 (arguing that punishment in international criminal law must integrate
international norms into local communities while accounting for cultural needs rather than imposing
cultural values). Compare Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets
Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 692-93 (2010) (suggesting that the ICC
should seek to harmonize its sentences with the domestic sentencing practice in the state where the
crimes were committed), and Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal
Law, 86 IND. L.J. 1063, 1128-29 (2011) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Pluralism] (arguing for a pluralist ap-
proach to international criminal law, and stating that "[s]o long as national legal systems continue to
embrace different views on the nature and consequences of criminality, the introduction of a distinctly
international criminal law will inevitably perpetuate or foster unequal treatment of one form or anoth-
er"), with DAVID HIRSH, LAW AGAINST GENOCIDE: COSMOPOLITAN TRIALS 159 (2003) (embracing the
emergence of cosmopolitanism in the work and results of the international criminal courts and arguing
that those courts have begun to forge "a cosmopolitan social memory"), and Patrick Hayden, Cosmopo-
litanism and the Need for Transnational Justice: The Case of the International Criminal Court, 104
THEORIA 69, 71 (2004) (advocating for an expansion of cosmopolitan values and objectives in transna-
tional criminal justice), and Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass
Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1826 (2005) (pointing out that "[m]uch has been made in recent
years of how international courts have begun to influence national ones through judicial dialogue. In this
way, cosmopolitan norms and self-understandings are increasingly injected into once-parochial munici-
pal adjudicytion"). Some scholars straddle the line between pluralism and cosmopolitanism.
156. Greenawalt, Pluralism, supra note 155, at 1099; see also Bibas & Burke-White, supra
note 155, at 692-93 (suggesting that the ICC consider the domestic sentencing practices of the territorial
state in order to achieve greater "vertical sentencing harmonization"); Woods, supra note 95, at 672
(suggesting that standardized sentencing practices might be counterproductive in an intemational crimi-
nal law scheme that seeks to "credibly express moral norms to local actors" if justice intuitions are not
universal). But see Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 155.
157. See Emily Haslam, Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of
Hope Over Experience?, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY
ISSUES 315, 319 (Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe & Eric Donnelly eds., 2004) ("[I]nternational crim-
inal justice should accord victims 'their rightful place' which if not 'at the heart of the international
criminal justice system' is very close to it."); Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Vic-
tims' Rights to Truth and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1399, 1427
(2002) (arguing that international criminal law could benefit from a more victim-focused point of view);
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approach suggests that international courts should draw on the sentencing
norms of victim communities, since to do otherwise is less likely to satisfy vic-
tims. Andrew Woods goes so far as to argue that international courts should
consider alternative forms of punishment beyond incarceration that appeal to
affected local communities.'
This Article rejects such arguments and adopts instead a cosmopolitan vi-
sion of the role of international courts that favors the development of global
sentencing norms. International courts, in particular the ICC, should not simply
be considered stand-ins for nonfunctioning national courts. Rather, the project
of international criminal law is essentially to build a community of global
norms.
While full development of the arguments supporting this global vision
must await future work, one important justification for rejecting a local, victim-
centered focus is practical-international courts simply do not have the ability
to make significant direct contributions to local justice. The ICC in particular
has the resources to investigate only a small number of situations around the
world and to prosecute a small number of cases in each situation. Prosecuting a
few perpetrators of crimes affecting thousands may have symbolic value for
crime victims, but is unlikely to satisfy calls for retribution or to contribute sig-
nificantly to local deterrence or reconciliation.
International courts can make significant indirect contributions to local
justice by stimulating local prosecutions. Indeed, this indirect effect is arguably
as important as their more direct contributions to global justice. At the ICC, this
indirect effect operates through the principle of complementarity, which prohi-
bits the ICC from prosecuting cases that national courts are pursuing in good
faith.' The ICC Prosecutor has taken this further by endorsing the notion of
"positive complementarity" whereby the ICC actively seeks to encourage na-
tional prosecutions.' 60
However, the role that international courts play in promoting local prose-
cutions does not support the argument that they should adopt local norms. On
the contrary, the threat that international courts will act inconsistently with lo-
cal norms may encourage some national governments to fulfill their obligations
to address international crimes. If international courts apply national norms, na-
tional governments will sometimes have less incentive to engage in their own
prosecutions.
Since the primary task of international courts is to promote global justice,
it is critical that they strive to build a community of shared criminal law norms
at the global level. This work is part of the broader process of strengthening the
Henham, supra note 53, at 769 ("[T]he demands for justice of victims and postconflict societies should
not simply be recognized symbolically as rationales for international punishment, but should be trans-
lated into effective procedural norms.").
158. Woods, supra note 95, at 673.
159. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 17.
160. See generally Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of
the Prosecutor, INT'L CRIM. CT. 5 (2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/IFA7C4C6-DE5F-
42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf. (explaining the meaning of "comple-
mentarity" in the context of the ICC's role in prosecuting crimes).
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"international community."1 6 1 The concept of community is aspirational. The
long-standing debate in the academic literature over whether any "community"
exists at the international level misses the point.162 As Georges Abi-Saab notes,
the question is not binary but relative.163 International cooperation and coordi-
nation confirm that some sort of community exists. The more useful inquiries
explore "the degree of community existing . . . in relation to a given subject, at
a given moment."'6
In regard to international criminal law norms, the degree of community at
the international level remains rather weak. This is to be expected of such a
new regime. Indeed, the enterprise is progressing more rapidly than many of its
founders anticipated. In just a couple of decades, a significant degree of con-
sensus has been built around the appropriate jurisdiction and procedures of in-
ternational courts. The ICC's membership includes more than half of the
world's states. Nonetheless, significant work remains to be done.
Contrary to the claims of some pluralists, 165 the solution to the current
weak state of consensus in many areas of international criminal law, including
sentencing, is not to require international criminal courts to apply national
norms. Undoubtedly, pluralism has important benefits. In particular, it enables
the development of multiple solutions to legal problems that can be compared
for their efficacy.166 However, if the central project of international criminal
courts is to build a normative community, such fragmentation is likely to un-
dermine the enterprise. The process of community building requires identifying
and enforcing shared normative commitments.
Such commitments are particularly important in the area of punishment
severity, which depends heavily on moral values. As centuries of philosophers
have argued, if collectives are to inflict suffering on individuals they must do so
in ways that comport with the dictates of morality. Thus, identifying a shared
morality in this area is important.
In addition to the normative arguments in favor of developing global sen-
tencing norms, as a practical matter, international judges would have great dif-
161. Cf Adeno Addis, Imagining the International Community: The Constitutive Dimension of
Universal Jurisdiction, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 129, 159 (2009) (arguing that the concept of universal jurisdic-
tion in international criminal law is both "vindicative and constitutive" of the concept of the "interna-
tional community").
162. See, e.g., GENNADIT MIKHAILOVICH DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMuNITY 11-12 (1993) (claiming that the perception of a "planetary community of individuals" is
seen as, at best, a grand, but futuristic, design); David C. Ellis, On the Possibility of "International
Community," 11 INT'L STUD. REv. 1, 23 (2009) (explaining that the state of the "international system"
can best be described, currently, as "international society" as the conditions for a true "international
community" are lacking given limited common interest and institutional coherence).
163. George Abi-Saab, Whither the International Community?, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 248, 249
(1998).
164. Id.; see also Karen Kovach, The International Community as Moral Agent, 2 J. MILITARY
ETHics 99, 100 (2003) ("The international community is a community of the world's people, peoples,
and states insofar as they take themselves to be part of a potentially universal agency.").
165. Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 155, at 640-42; Greenawalt, Pluralism, supra note 155,
at 1067-69, 1078-79.
166. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155, 1190-91
(2007) ("Just as states in a federal system function as 'laboratories' of innovation, so too the preserva-
tion of diverse legal spaces makes innovation possible.").
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ficulty applying the sentencing norms of national systems with which they are
unfamiliar. Even identifying the relevant norms would be challenging because
there is a surprising lack of information collected about sentencing practices
around the world.167 Moreover, sentencing norms can differ dramatically even
within national communities. In the United States, for example, there is signifi-
cant variation in sentence severity among states.168 Thus, efforts to apply the
sentencing norms of affected communities would, at least in some cases, re-
quire judges to look beyond national laws to regional and local laws.
This is not to suggest that the task of developing global sentencing norms
will be easy. Indeed, in the early years, this process will likely be more difficult
than it would be simply to apply relevant national norms. As the first Part of
this Article demonstrated, people around the world have widely different pers-
pectives on the appropriate severity of punishment. As a result, the limited in-
ternational sentencing precedents that exist are inconsistent and provide little
useful guidance to the ICC or future courts. Nonetheless, by identifying and
consistently applying international sentencing norms, international courts can
greatly reduce the challenges associated with sentencing over time.
In sum, the community-building aspect of the international criminal law
project suggests that international courts should develop their own sentence se-
verity norms rather than apply those of national communities. As the ICC be-
gins to sentence defendants it is thus critical that it start to identify relevant
norms. As the next Section explains, one source of such norms should be inter-
national human rights. Although international human rights law supplies only a
few firm guidelines for international sentencing, the principles underlying hu-
man rights norms, in particular the principle of human dignity, counsel interna-
tional courts to err on the side of leniency.
B. The Relevance ofInternational Human Rights
Given the diversity of sentence severity norms around the world, how
should international courts begin to identify and develop global norms in this
area? As William Schabas has argued, they should look to human rights norms
for guidance.169 The relevance of human rights to the work of international
criminal courts is widely recognized.170 Indeed, it was to a large extent the
167. The United Nations compiles detailed data relating to crime patterns around the world,
including prosecution, conviction, and detention rates by country and by various population demograph-
ics, but specific data on sentencing practices are scant. See Data: Statistics on Criminal Justice (Persons
Detained), UN OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis
/statistics/data.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2013).
168. See generally Paula M. Ditton & Doris James Wilson, Truth in Sentencing in State Pris-
ons, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Jan. 1999), http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf (analyzing va-
riances in truth-in-sentencing laws in the United States and consequent differences in sentence length
and time served by released violent offenders in different states).
169. See Schabas, Sentencing, supra note 1, at 495.
170. See, e.g., SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 2 (2005) (explaining that respect for the rights of defendants has been a fundamental con-
cern of international criminal law at least since the advent of the ad hoc tribunals); Maximo Langer,
Trends and Tensions in International Criminal Procedure: A Symposium, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 1, 4 (2009) (discussing various approaches to international criminal procedure and the
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post-World War II human rights movement that fueled the development of in-
ternational criminal law. '7 1 The establishment of the ICC was greatly propelled
by the involvement of human rights organizations.172 The Court's statute re-
quires that its work be consistent with international human rights.'7 With re-
gard to conditions of imprisonment, for example, the statute requires the Court
to adhere to "widely accepted international treaty standards governing treat-
ment of prisoners."1 7 4
However, in their zeal to promote the human rights of victims by prose-
cuting international crimes, supporters of international criminal law sometimes
lose sight of the rights of defendants. They argue for instance in favor of very
broad definitions of crimes and support limited defenses that threaten to convict
the morally innocent.175 With regard to sentencing, those who advocate for
mercy at the national level tend to adopt a more severely punitive stance for in-
temational crimes.176 Such one-sided respect for human rights detracts from the
the project of building a community of universally applicable norms. Instead,
international courts should both promote victims' rights by prosecuting viola-
tions of those rights, and foster defendants' rights by developing punishment
norms that reflect established human rights as well as the principles that ani-
mate them.
Existing human rights norms suggest that international punishment sever-
ity should be restricted in at least three ways: (1) the death penalty should be
precluded; (2) life sentences should be avoided, except perhaps in the most ex-
treme cases, and should always include the possibility of early release; and (3)
conditions of incarceration should be humane. Of these, the norm prohibiting
the death penalty is the most strongly established. Many states are parties to
treaties prohibiting the death penalty 77 and such punishment is arguably prohi-
impact of international human rights law on its goals).
171. Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J.
237, 242 (1998) (arguing that "[t]he silence of international law regarding the consequences for gov-
emment-sponsored human rights abuses began to change after the first World War, and even more so
after World War It").
172. See Kristie Barrow, The Role of NGOs in the Establishment of the International Criminal
Court, 2 DIALOGUE 11, 22 (2004) (chronicling the detailed history of NGO involvement in the creation
of the ICC).
173. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 21(3) ("The application and interpretation of law pur-
suant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights . . .
174. Id. at art. 106(1).
175. Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis ofInternational Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
925, 929 (2008) ("[T]he influence of interpretive approaches from human rights and humanitarian law,
such as victim-focused teleological reasoning ... not only undermines strict construction but also fosters
sweeping interpretations that run afoul of culpability and fair labelling [sic].").
176. See Schabas, Sentencing, supra note 1, at 501 (stating that even human rights advocates
often argue for severe punishment for international crimes in the name of retribution).
177. Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms Concerning Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, opened for signa-
ture May 2012, E.T.S. No. 183 (43 states parties); Second Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414 (74 state parties); Protocol No. 6 to
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning
Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for signature Apr. 28, 1983, E.T.S. No. 114 (46 state parties);
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, Aug. 6, 1980,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 73 (13 state parties); Death Penalty: Ratification ofInternational Treaties, AMNESTY
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bited by customary international law. 78 As noted above, no international court
permits the death penalty.179
Nonetheless, the decision to exclude the death penalty at international
courts has sometimes encountered significant opposition. For instance, the
Rwandan government, which had originally supported the establishment of the
ICTR, withdrew its support when it became clear that the Tribunal would not
be permitted to impose the death penalty. so Indeed, the preclusion of the death
penalty at the ICTR has led to the incongruous result that some of the most re-
sponsible perpetrators have been incarcerated in European prisons while lower
level perpetrators have been sentenced to death by national courts.' 8 Despite
this discrepancy, for many of the states that supported the establishment of the
ICTR, exclusion of the death penalty was nonnegotiable.' 82 In fact, as the ICTR
ICTR began the process of concluding its work, it refused to refer cases to the
Rwandan national courts until Rwanda abolished the death penalty. Similar-
ly, while the drafters of the Rome Statute engaged in a vigorous debate about
whether to include the death penalty, a significant number of states made it
clear that they could not support an institution that puts people to death.184
Thus, while the prohibition of the death penalty is not universally accepted, the
norm is strong enough that many consider it a requirement of human rights.
Less established, but perhaps emerging as a human rights norm, is the
prohibition on life sentences except in exceptional casess along with the re-
quirement that such sentences be accompanied by the possibility of parole.'
8 6
INT'L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/ratification-of-intemational-treaties (last visited Dec. 9,
2013).
178. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 2002) (stating in 2002 that capital punishment was not yet prohibited by customary law, but
that the growing trend against it meant that "[this] will not be true for very long"); see also U.N. GAOR,
67th Sess., 20th & 21st mtgs. at 1, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/4046 (Oct. 23, 2012) (stating that "[t]he Special
Rapporteur on Torture called on States in the Third Committee (Social Humanitarian and Cultural) to-
day to seriously reconsider whether the death penalty amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading treat-
ment, or even torture").
179. See supra note 33.
180. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 548 (2006).
181. See Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass
Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 177 (2000) (explaining that this incongruity in sentencing
was one of Rwanda's reasons for opposing the ICTR ban on the death penalty).
182. Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 748 (stating with regard to the estab-
lishment of the ICTR, "U]ust as the permissibility of the death penalty was considered so obvious at Nu-
remberg that no serious discussion of the matter was required, so its impermissibility was now consi-
dered so obvious that once again no serious debate ensued").
183. Greenawalt, Pluralism, supra note 155, at 1131 n.172 (stating that Rwanda eliminated the
death penalty primarily to facilitate referral of cases).
184. Rolf Einar Fife, Penalties, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF
THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATION, RESULTS 319, 322-32 (1999).
185. Catherine Appleton & Bent Grover, The Pros and Cons ofLife without Parole, 47 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 597, 606 (2007); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing that far from
allowing life sentences, many European states' maximum sentences are ten to fifteen years imprison-
ment).
186. J. Paul McCutcheon & Gerard Coffey, Life Sentences in Ireland and the European Con-
vention, 3 IRISH Y.B. INT'L L. 101, 101 (2012) (discussing the limitations that the European Court of
Human Rights has placed on life sentences); Dirk van Zyl Smit, Life Imprisonment: Recent Issues in
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The European Court of Human Rights has adopted such limitations, 87 as have
many national systems. Even the United States, with its harsh sentencing
culture, recently recognized the impermissibility of life sentences without pa-
role for persons under the age of eighteen who commit non-homicide of-
fenses.189 International courts have rightly been at the forefront of these devel-
opments as well. They impose life sentences relatively infrequently and
typically only for genocide, which is generally considered the most serious
crime.190 The possibility of release is never precluded.
Finally, there is general agreement that international human rights pro-
scribe harsh prison conditions.191 In this respect, international courts have thus
far been less attentive to human rights, permitting incarceration in states with
very tough prison conditions.192 As already noted, the ICC's statute requires it
to adhere to international treaties restricting conditions of incarceration. There
is thus reason to hope that the ICC will be more conscientious in ensuring hu-
mane prison conditions.
In addition to complying with these existing human rights norms, interna-
tional criminal courts should situate their punishments at the leading edge of
developing human rights norms concerning sentences.' 93 Human rights norms
are constantly evolving. The solidifying prohibition of the death penalty and
recently recognized prohibition of life sentences without parole for juveniles in
the United States and for all in Europe are three examples of such development.
National and International Law, 29 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 405, 409-10 (2006) (discussing that the
European Court of Human Rights and several European constitutional courts have questioned the com-
patibility with human rights norms of life sentences without the possibility of release).
187. Vinter v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 12, 119-22 (2013), (finding the United King-
dom's "whole life order" policy allowing for the imposition of life sentences without parole for offenses
deemed exceptionally serious to be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
188. Dirk van Zyl Smit, Outlawing Irreducible Life Sentences: Europe on the Brink?, 23 FED.
SENT'G REP. 39, 40-41 (2010) [hereinafter van Zyl Smit, Outlawing]. The Constitutions of Brazil and
Colombia, for example, explicitly prohibit the use of life imprisonment. CONSTITUlcAO FEDERAL [C.F.]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.); CONSTITuCI6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 34.
189. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding unconstitutional
the sentence of life without parole for a juvenile who committed a non-homicide offense).
190. Compare Smeulers et al., supra note 37, at 22-23 (explaining that in the post-Cold War
tribunals, only 45 out of 281 (16%) convicted perpetrators received life sentences, and of those, 21 were
convicted at the ICTR where 52 out of 61 sentenced'individuals were convicted for genocide; 10 of the
45 life sentences are still in some stage of appeal), with Ashley Nellis, Life Goes On: The Historic Rise
in Life Sentences in America, SENT'G PROJECT 6 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications
fincLife%20Goes%200n%202013.pdf (citing statistics in the United States where 10.6% of all incar-
cerated individuals-including nonviolent offenders-are serving life sentences).
191. See e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EVENTS OF 2012, at 640 (2013)
(accusing the United States of prison "[p]ractices contrary to human right principles [including] solitary
confinement"); Bruce Zagaris, Developments in the Institutional Architecture and Framework ofInter-
national Criminal and Enforcement Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 421, 459 (2006) (referring to poor prison conditions as human rights violations).
192. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; cf Schabas, Sentencing, supra note 1, at 494-95
(arguing that provisions in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes recommending that defendants serve their sen-
tences in specific, internationally designated prisons rather than their home countries may result in
harsher penalty conditions due to isolation from family, unfamiliar conditions, and inability to commu-
nicate or socialize while incarcerated).
193. Cf Schabas, Sentencing, supra note 1, at 516 ("As human rights tribunals, the ad hoc tri-
bunals should be aware that they are mandated to provide a model of enlightened justice.").
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Although human rights law does not currently contain restrictions on sen-
tence severity beyond those already discussed, the principle of human dignity at
the core of the human rights regime suggests that lengthy terms of incarceration
for all but the most serious crimes are increasingly recognized as violating hu-
man rights. Respect for human dignity arguably requires not only humane con-
ditions of incarceration but also recognizing and affirming the possibility of re-
habilitation and redemption.' 94 Indeed, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights mandates that the aim of any system of imprisonment must be
"reformation and social rehabilitation."' 95 Harsh punishment is antithetical to
these objectives.
The Rome Statute appropriately reflects such evolving norms by limiting
terms of incarceration to thirty years except when life imprisonment is justified
by the "extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the
convicted person." 96 Other international courts, including the ICTR and SCSL,
SCSL, which have imposed much harsher sentences, should likewise respect
such limitations on sentence lengths.
In sum, in developing global sentencing norms, international courts
should respect existing as well as developing human rights norms. By doing so,
international courts both affirm the developing norms and serve as examples to
national courts.197
C. Responding to Objections
Given the diversity of sentence severity norms around the world, criticism
of international sentences is inevitable, at least until the regime develops its
own norms against which sentences can be judged. This Section suggests how
international courts can address some of the criticisms that may arise should
they follow the recommendation of inflicting sentences at the lenient end of the
spectrum.
First, some retributivists will likely object that the sentences fail to inflict
adequate retribution. As already explained, this argument inaccurately posits
that retribution mandates particular amounts of punishment for particular
crimes. Since punishment severity is instead a matter of community norms, in-
194. See Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and
the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 How. L.J. 753, 758-59 (2011) (recognizing
redemption is an essential element to "a mature justice system"); Nilsen, supra note 20, at 159-66 (dis-
cussing how the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution may demand a similarly robust respect for
human dignity in sentencing as found in European countries, noting that international law finds that
"barriers to a prisoner's successful reintegration violate his fundamental dignity rights"); van Zyl Smit,
Outlawing, supra note 188, at 40 (noting the Germany Federal Constitutional Court's determination that
prisoners have a right, based in human dignity, to resocialization).
195. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10(3), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; see also Schabas, Sentencing, supra note 1, at 503 (discussing additional sources of hu-
man rights law supporting the importance of rehabilitation). The European Court of Human Rights has
recently affirmed this sentencing goal in the Vinter decision. Vinter v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2013).
196. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 77.
197. William A. Schabas, Penalties, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY 1497, 1533 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
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ternational courts can respond to this critique by pointing out that many com-
munities reject the premise that harsh punishment is required for any crime. In-
deed, some communities view harsh punishment as a violation of human rights,
a charge that would be especially damaging to the legitimacy of international
courts in light of their close connections with the human rights movement.
Likewise, some critics will attack lenient punishment not based on the
general requirements of retribution but rather on the purported needs for retri-
bution of specific victims.198 International sentencing judgments sometimes
invite such criticism by invoking the goal of retribution without specifying for
whom the retribution is intended.'99 International courts should clarify that, to
the extent retribution is one of their sentencing goals, their aim is not to satisfy
particular victims, who may have varying expectations regarding appropriate
amounts of punishment, but rather to act on behalf of the global community.
Moreover, in some cases, courts may explicitly privilege goals other than
retribution in inflicting lenient punishment. For instance, societal rehabilitation
may sometimes be an important objective that would be undermined by harsh
punishment. Both the perpetrator and any groups that identify with him or her
are likely to view harsh punishment as unjust, reducing the likelihood of recon-
ciliation.
An especially troubling critique may come not from retributivists but
from expressivists. Proponents of the expressive function of international pu-
nishment may argue that mild or moderate punishment fails to express suffi-
cient condemnation to promote the norms prohibiting international crimes. 20 0
The expression of global norms concerning international crimes is probably the
most important goal of international prosecution. 201 Such expression is critical
to the courts' central objective of preventing international crimes. It is therefore
crucial that international punishment norms support rather than undermine this
198. See, e.g., Katie Kerr, Making Peace with Criminals: An Economic Approach to Assessing
Punishment Options in the Colombian Peace Process, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 53, 98 (2005)
("The desire for retribution is a powerful emotion among the surviving victims and family members of
victims of gross human rights violations."); Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory, supra note 1, at 399 ("In
addition to the basic fact that the guilty deserve to be punished, the victims of various conflicts . . .may
feel that the guilty deserve to be punished.").
199. See, e.g., Danner, supra note 53, at 444 ("In their sentencing decisions, the Tribunals have
most often cited deterrence and retribution as the principal justifications for international punishment ...
. [T]he Tribunals have not directly connected these justifications for punishment with the methodology
used to determine individual sentences.").
200. Beresford, supra note 91, at 90 (stating that "[1]ower sentences would not only fail to deter
prospective violators of international humanitarian law, they would signal that genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes are less serious than ordinary crimes under national law"); Keller, supra note
86, at 66 (citing Mary Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal
Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 321, 383-86 (2000)) ("Unfortunately, neither Erdemovic's nor Serusha-
go's prison sentences 'communicate the appropriate disgust or intolerance necessary to dissuade' poten-
tial perpetrators in the Balkans or Rwanda from massacring other innocent civilians.").
201. See generally, Mirjan R. Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?,
83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 345 (2008) (claiming that international criminal courts are in a better posi-
tion to promote "a sense of accountability for international crime by exposure and stigmatization of ...
extreme forms of inhumanity" than to deter future perpetrators); Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to
Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265, 270
(2012) [hereinafter deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute] (arguing that norm expression is the most appro-
priate goal on which to base the ICC's situation and case selection decisions).
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expressive function.
International courts can address such concerns in at least two ways. First,
they can point to the diversity of sentence severity norms around the world to
argue that in many quarters the sentences they award are in fact considered ap-
propriate for serious crimes. Moreover, over time, the courts' own consistent
application of mild or moderate punishments will render such punishments
normative at the international level.
Additionally, international courts can explain that the expressive effect of
international criminal law comes at least as much from the process of investi-
gating, trying, and convicting offenders of international crimes as from the par-
202ticular punishments inflicted. Unlike national systems where the presumption
is that most crimes will be punished, at the international level the mere selec-
tion of crimes for adjudication performs an important expressive function. 203 In
fact, international courts have already made such statements in some of their
judgments. 204
VI. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the claims of the prevalent scholarly critique, there is nothing
in punishment theory that mandates harsh punishment for international crimes.
Moreover, proponents of harsh international punishment implicitly rely on the
intuitive but erroneous assumption that international crimes are uniformly so
grave as to merit harsh punishment. The gravity rhetoric, as well as the narra-
tives of monstrosity and good and evil that characterize international criminal
law, have the potential to distort judicial analysis of crime seriousness and lead
to overpunishment. Rather than rely on theory or intuition, therefore, interna-
tional courts should recognize that punishment severity norms are largely a
matter of community consensus.
While some scholars have urged international courts to apply the national
sentencing norms of relevant communities, such an approach would undermine
the global community-building project in which the courts are engaged. In-
stead, international courts should develop their own sentence severity norms in
accordance with existing and emerging norms of human rights and respect for
human dignity.
While the process of developing international sentence severity norms is
barely underway, the conclusions reached in this Article suggest that interna-
tional courts are generally moving in the right direction. They have rightly re-
jected the death penalty and strictly limited their use of life sentences. The ICC
202. See David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of In-
ternational Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 576-77 (Samantha Besson
& John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
203. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 201, at 269-70.
204. Id.; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgement, 1 202 (Feb. 22, 2008). The Appeal Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber but
declined to enter a separate conviction for forced marriage on grounds that the required condemnation of
the act "is adequately reflected by recognising that such conduct is criminal" and that it constitutes an
"Other Inhumane Act" capable of giving rise to individual criminal responsibility in international law.
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restricts terms of imprisonment to thirty years, except in extremely grave cases.
It sentenced its first defendant to a term of fourteen years, despite the prosecu-
tor's recommendation of thirty.
In further developing sentence severity norms, international courts, in
particular the ICC, should continue to reject calls for harsh punishment and in-
stead err on the side of leniency. In particular, it is critical that the ICC Appeals
Chamber resists calls for harsher punishment in the Lubanga case. As the ICC's
first punishment decision, the Lubanga sentence will serve as a marker against
which future punishment will be measured. A harsh sentence would set the ICC
on the wrong course. The judges should also continue to reject the prosecutor's
argument for a presumptive twenty-four-year sentence for all crimes. Such a
presumption would almost certainly result in excessively harsh punishment in
at least some cases.

